Document Type : Original Article
Authors
1
Permanent member of the Academy of Sciences of Iran and professor at the seminary and university.
2
Graduate of the Qom Seminary.
Abstract
In this article, the importance of ancillary jurisprudence (fiqh al-muḍāf) is first discussed. However, in this writing, ancillary jurisprudence is reconsidered through new methods of engaging with jurisprudential sources, on the condition that this reconsideration does not entail the destruction of the heritage. This novel approach has not been customary in the earlier jurisprudential literature of Shīʿa scholarship. For instance, in this method, we specify certain general principles (ʿāmm) through human-specific qualifications (mukhaṣṣiṣāt), yet we do not apply specification when the qualification is entirely open to interpretation; instead, we act upon the general principle so as not to fall into an inhumane theory. The article then elaborates on the difference between this method and the secularization (or conventionalization) of jurisprudence. The secularization that is avoided here is one that abandons the most complete and perfect criteria to convention and entirely suspends reason. Ultimately, it is demonstrated that this method represents a new approach to jurisprudential sources and differs significantly from conventionalizing jurisprudence.
Another subject addressed in this article is the special place of art in human society and the demonstration that this issue is not a recent phenomenon. In the author's view, the art that exists today is the same ancient art, only its colors and expressions have changed. Art as a whole is a historical matter and is not specific to any particular time. The lifespan of art is tied to the lifespan of humanity. In this method, when the jurist refers to the sources, exercises double precision, and examines the issue in greater detail, he arrives at the conclusion that these matters have no connection with the essence of art. Separating the accidental from the essential in the jurisprudence of art is another requirement of this approach, necessitating that the innovative jurist re-examine the heritage anew.
In this article, we will re-examine certain examples of artistic subjects to articulate the necessity of this method and its different outcomes. In fact, one who derives a ruling based on essence must provide evidence for its essential nature. In the case of sculpture, if we re-read the evidence alongside historical events and circumstances, we will find that sculpture was deemed forbidden (ḥarām) because it was associated with worship and a form of polytheism, and this art had served as a vehicle for promoting polytheism. In the present time, however, sculpture bears no relation to polytheism or idol worship; thus, due to the change in subject matter, its ruling must also change, for its prohibition was accidental.
Separating the essential from the accidental resolves many problems in the domain of art. Articulating the rationale and wisdom behind a ruling is among the matters in which the ruling is given by recourse to the wisdom of the subject. Now, if the wisdom (not the cause) of a matter changes, the ruling must also change. In the final part of this article, this issue and the method of deriving it are discussed.
Keywords
Theology of Art