The Scope of Freedom of Expression in Artistic Criticism.

Document Type : Original Article

Author
Associate Professor at the Research Institute of Islamic Sciences and Culture.
Abstract
One of the major and very common capacities of art—especially in forms such as film, theater, poetry, satire, and fiction—is the critique of shortcomings, ideas, morals, and wrongful behaviors, and the struggle against them. However, criticism in every society and culture is subject to certain conditions and criteria. In religious culture and within the framework of Islam's eternal teachings, in both the domains of jurisprudence and ethics, we encounter restrictions and conditions for criticizing others, which collectively indicate the characteristics of proper and permissible criticism. These restrictions raise the question: what is the scope of freedom of expression in artistic criticism, and how is it defined? This question becomes even more significant in the context of combating social oppression and injustice, and in criticizing those who violate the material and spiritual rights of the people, including both individual and social rights.
One of the ethical and jurisprudential restrictions is the prohibition of backbiting (ghībah), the thematic scope of which also includes public and social matters. Thus, it must be examined how artistic criticism relates to this ethical and jurisprudential ruling and its exceptions. Given that "seeking redress against injustice" (taẓallum) is a clear example of an exception to this prohibition, can the scope of this exception be understood in such a way that it not only does not limit art's ability to confront oppressive behaviors and those who trample upon the rights of society, but rather aligns it with that purpose? This article demonstrates that from a jurisprudential perspective—and also from an interpretive standpoint—it is possible, and indeed necessary, to side with those who adopt such a broad view and do not restrict seeking redress to complaints lodged with specific institutions.
What connects this discussion to freedom of expression in artistic criticism is, on the one hand, the approach that jurists have rightly taken in expanding the permissibility of seeking redress, including in terms of methodology, and on the other hand, the broad meaning of "injustice" (ẓulm) and consequently "seeking redress" (taẓallum)—in both individual and social dimensions, material and spiritual, and in various spheres including personal, public, governmental, and international. What is indicated by certain verses and traditions, as elaborated in this article, and what has been articulated by great jurists such as Shaykh Anṣārī and especially Imam Khomeini, greatly expands the scope of freedom of expression in combating injustice and oppression—including through artistic forms—and places the hands of the oppressed in a position of superior power for publicizing and exposing those who violate people's rights. It harnesses artistic and media capacities, alongside other individual and social capabilities, in the service of supporting the oppressed, restoring their rights, and blunting the sword of oppressors.
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